On January 17, 2014, the State Council promulgated the Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"), effective as of March 1, 2014. The Regulations have played a significant role in advancing the law-based management of secrecy, guarding state secrets, and safeguarding national security and interests.

In recent years, profound changes have taken place in the international and domestic landscape, presenting new challenges and tasks for secrecy work. To adapt to these changes, the newly revised Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (hereinafter referred to as the "Secrecy Law") has further improved the secrecy management system and mechanisms. To thoroughly implement the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee on secrecy work, refine the relevant provisions of the Secrecy Law, and specify concrete implementation measures, it is necessary to revise the Regulations. On June 26, 2024, the executive meeting of the State Council reviewed and adopted the Revised Draft of the Regulations. On July 10, 2024, Premier Li Qiang signed a State Council decree, officially promulgating the revised Regulations, effective as of September 1, 2024.

I. Key Contents of the Revision of the Regulations

1. Upholding and Strengthening the Party's Leadership over Secrecy Work

The revision of the Regulations adds a specific provision on Party leadership over secrecy work, further emphasizing the adherence to and strengthening of the leadership of the Communist Party of China over secrecy work, and improving the institutional mechanisms for Party leadership over secrecy. It clarifies the specific responsibilities of the central secrecy work leading body and local secrecy work leading bodies at various levels, thereby providing institutional safeguards for implementing the national secrecy work strategies and major policy measures of the Party and the State, and for better leveraging the political and organizational advantages of Party leadership over secrecy.

2. Classification Management

The Regulations further refine and improve the classification management system:

First, it clarifies the requirements for the formulation and revision of the list of state secret items. The list of state secret items clearly and intuitively sets forth the state secret items, classification levels, duration of classification, scope of authorized persons, and the basis for classification. The Regulations stipulate that organs and units with classification authority shall, based on the scope of secret matters in their own industry, field, and related industries and fields, formulate a list of state secret items, thereby ensuring the precision and scientific nature of classification work from the source.

Second, it further specifies the scope of classification officers and their specific duties. The Regulations clarify that the principal responsible person of an organ or unit is the statutory classification officer of that organ or unit, and may, based on work requirements, designate a certain scope of personnel as designated classification officers. At the same time, it further improves the specific duties of classification officers. Third, it specifies the specific circumstances under which derivative classification shall occur. Derivative classification is an important method of classification. The Regulations enumerate the specific circumstances under which derivative classification shall be carried out, providing more scientific and detailed guidance for organs and units on derivative classification, which is conducive to regulating derivative classification practices and effectively avoiding the problem of excessive or overly broad derivative classification.

3. Strengthening Innovation and Protection in Secrecy Science and Technology

The Regulations stipulate the following with respect to strengthening innovation and protection in secrecy science and technology:

First, emphasis is placed on innovation in secrecy science and technology. Research and application in secrecy science and technology are encouraged and supported, and organizations and individuals that have achieved significant results or made outstanding contributions in the research and development of secrecy science and technology shall be commended and rewarded.

Second, attention is given to the confidentiality management of information equipment and information systems. It is clearly stipulated that state organs and entities shall strengthen the operation, maintenance, and usage management of information systems and information equipment, conduct regular risk assessments of classified information systems, and ensure the safety and reliability of information equipment used in classified information systems.

Third, the management requirements for security and confidentiality products and confidentiality technical equipment are refined. The obligations of manufacturing and research entities are clearly defined, and the adoption of new technologies, new methods, and new processes for innovation is encouraged. Where non-compliance with national confidentiality regulations and standards is discovered during spot checks or re-inspections, corresponding remedial measures are specified, thereby effectively promoting the continuous improvement of the quality of security and confidentiality products and confidentiality technical equipment.

4.Confidentiality Management of Network Information and Data

The Regulations further standardize the confidentiality management of network information and data:

First, confidentiality management in network usage is strengthened. It is stipulated that personnel of state organs and entities shall not use non-classified information systems or information equipment to store, process, or transmit state secrets in violation of relevant regulations, and the use of smart terminal products, among others, shall comply with national confidentiality regulations.

Second, the obligation of network operators to cooperate with legally conducted investigations into confidentiality violation cases and the排查 of early warning incidents is clarified. Third, the data confidentiality management system is improved, the primary responsibility of state organs and entities for the security protection of classified data is reinforced, full-process management requirements for classified data are specified, risks of leakage under big data conditions are effectively prevented, and a solid confidentiality defense line is practically established.

5.Management of Personnel with Access to Classified Information

Drawing on years of practical experience in managing personnel with access to classified information, the Regulations further refine the management requirements for such personnel:

First, a "full life cycle" management system for personnel with access to classified information is established, with detailed provisions on pre-employment confidentiality review and periodic re-review, in-service confidentiality management and confidentiality education and training, procedures and requirements for resignation or dismissal, and management during the de-briefing period.

Second, provisions for protecting the rights and interests of personnel with access to classified information are refined. State organs and entities are required to establish and improve a system for safeguarding the rights and interests of such personnel, and to provide corresponding treatment or compensation, in accordance with relevant state regulations, to personnel whose legitimate rights and interests are affected or restricted due to the fulfillment of confidentiality obligations.

II. Typical Cases of Leakage of State Secrets

The following are several typical cases of leakage of state secrets officially released by the secrecy administration, in order to facilitate a more intuitive understanding of the relevant provisions of the "Secrecy Law" and the "Regulations."

Case 1: Buying, Selling, Transferring, or Privately Destroying Carriers of State Secrets

[Case Summary]

In May 2018, He, a new employee of a public institution, was assigned to work in the secretarial department. Due to being new to the job and unfamiliar with the work situation and relevant laws and regulations, he failed to comply with the management regulations for the destruction of classified documents. He handed over three bound volumes of classified materials (classified as "Secret") to cleaning personnel for disposal. The cleaning personnel treated the volumes as waste and sold them to a mobile waste collection station. The matter was promptly discovered by staff of the secrecy administration, who confiscated the materials. Subsequently, the relevant authority imposed a demerit of a major nature on He.

[Case Analysis]

Carriers of state secrets are owned by the state and must be distributed or equipped in accordance with relevant state regulations. No organization or individual may buy, sell, transfer, or dispose of such carriers without authorization, in order to ensure the security and integrity of state secrets. All agencies and units shall strictly follow state rules and standards to properly handle carriers of state secrets, ensuring that the risk of leakage is completely eliminated when they are no longer needed. Furthermore, no organization or individual may privately destroy such carriers, in order to safeguard national security and interests and ensure the effective protection of state secrets.

Case 2: Transmitting Carriers of State Secrets via Channels Lacking Security Measures, such as Regular Postal Service or Courier Services

[Case Summary]

In May 2006, Yuan, a technician nearing retirement at a military industrial unit, received a phone call from a friend requesting assistance in providing some manufacturing standards for military products for reference. Without going through any formal procedures, the obliging Yuan asked a colleague to make three copies of the relevant materials and sent them via regular mail. Upon appraisal, the materials were determined to be classified state secrets at the "Confidential" level. Yuan received a demerit of a major nature from his unit, had his re-employment offer revoked, and was fined.

[Case Analysis]

Channels such as regular postal service, courier services, and logistics typically lack the necessary security and confidentiality safeguards. Transmitting classified carriers through these channels may lead to a loss of control over classified information and can easily result in leakage incidents. Therefore, such conduct must be strictly prohibited to ensure the security of state secrets and sensitive information.

Case Three: Sending or Shipping State Secrets Out of the Country by Mail or Freight, or Carrying or Transmitting State Secrets Out of the Country Without Approval from the Relevant Competent Authorities

[Case Summary]

During an entry-exit inspection at a customs office, it was discovered that a briefcase belonging to Gao, an employee of a classified entity, contained a classified document at the "Secret" level. Investigation revealed that Gao had been assigned by his entity to conduct a survey for an overseas aid project. He carried the document out of the country due to work requirements but failed to obtain the necessary permit and complete the relevant procedures in accordance with national regulations. Following the incident, the relevant authorities imposed a disciplinary demerit record on Gao and subjected him to serious criticism and education.

[Case Analysis]

To ensure the security and compliance of classified information and to mitigate the risk of information leakage, the transmission of classified materials abroad must strictly adhere to relevant national regulations. For all destinations that can be reached by diplomatic courier, the materials shall be transported by such courier. If the destination is not accessible by diplomatic courier, or if it is genuinely necessary to personally carry the materials out of the country due to work requirements, an application for the corresponding approval must be submitted to the competent保密 administrative department or agency with the authority to grant such approval.

Case Four: Involving State Secrets in Personal Interactions and Communications

[Case Summary]

In October 2017, Lu, the head of a business section at a certain agency, borrowed a classified document at the "Confidential" level from the agency's保密 custodian, Zhang, for his own study and research. While studying the document, Lu found that some of its ideas and viewpoints might also be beneficial to his wife's professional work. Believing that "using it for reference is not the same as direct use, and it should not be a big problem," Lu secretly photographed parts of the document with his mobile phone and sent them to his wife, Zhang, via WeChat. Upon receipt, Zhang did not forward the information to any third party. Following the incident, the relevant authorities imposed a warning within the Party and a disciplinary demerit record on Lu, and transferred him from his original position; a warning within the Party was also imposed on Han, Lu's supervising leader.

[Case Analysis]

Involving state secrets in personal interactions and communications leads to an improper expansion of the scope of knowledge, thereby creating a risk of information loss of control. This may not only result in the disclosure of sensitive information to individuals who should not have access to it but may also have a severe impact on national security. Therefore, it is strictly prohibited to discuss or transmit any classified information in private settings. Relevant personnel must adhere to confidentiality regulations, remain vigilant, and ensure the security and integrity of state secrets.

Conclusion

The Secrecy Law and the Regulations constitute the essential legal framework for the protection of state secrets in China. They define the scope, classification, and management requirements of state secrets, emphasize the importance and necessity of confidentiality work, and stipulate relevant responsibilities and punitive measures. Furthermore, the Regulations elaborate on the specific operational procedures for confidentiality work, including the collection, storage, transmission, and destruction of information, ensuring that state secrets are effectively protected at all levels. Together, these laws and regulations establish a systematic confidentiality management system aimed at safeguarding national security and social stability, and preventing the disclosure of state secrets.